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1.  Introduction 
 
Every political dispensation in recent decades has taken the view that the country 
has to be able to feed itself. For the country’s political leaders and the agriculture 
bureaucracy, this has meant that rice, the country’s staple food, has to be locally 
produced at quantity sufficient to meet the rice requirement of the burgeoning population. 
Indeed, rice self-sufficiency has been an objective enshrined in all government programs 
for the agricultural sector since the early 1960s. To achieve the objective, the 
Government has intervened, albeit in varying degrees, in the marketplace to affect 
virtually all segments of the supply chain, including importation, and of the demand 
spectrum. Yet, self-sufficiency has remained elusive. The population is far from being 
more food-secure now than a decade or two ago. Over the years, rice has become more 
expensive in the Philippines than in most developing countries of Asia. This has caused 
reduction in the purchasing power of the incomes of the poor, including landless farmers 
and urban poor workers whose spending on rice constitutes about 22% of their total 
household expenditure. Arguably, this could partly explain for the much higher incidence 
of absolute poverty in the Philippines than in Indonesia, Thailand, and even Vietnam 
(Balisacan 2003). What has gone wrong? 
 
In this paper, we examine the performance of the rice sector over the last three 
decades. Our aim is to identify policy imperatives and investment options for the sector 
in the wake of globalization and population pressure. While a number of observations 
found in the paper are not new and have already been pointed out elsewhere (see, e.g., 
David 2003, Roumasset 2000, Clarete 1999, Tolentino 1999, David and Balisacan 1995), 
we move beyond the usual description of past performance to include as well an ex-ante 
assessment of the effects of trade policy reforms on the rice economy in the short and 
medium terms.  
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2. Performance of the Rice Sector  
 
The rice sector has continued to account for about 20% of agriculture’s gross 
value added (Figure 1). It is also the single most important source of livelihood among 
small farmers and landless agricultural workers who comprise the bulk of the agricultural 
labor force (who in turn represent 40% of the labor force nationwide). It is thus not 
surprising that the growth trend in rice production roughly mirrors that in agriculture 
(Figure 2).  
 
With the introduction of modern rice technology in the second half of the 1960s, 
coupled with substantial investment in irrigation, rice production grew remarkably at an 
average annual rate of 5.9% in the 1970s (Table 1). The country turned from being a net 
importer to being self sufficient and even a marginal rice exporter towards the end of the 
1970s until the early years of the 1980s (Table 2). 
 
Production growth slowed down significantly in the 1980s. The average growth of 
2.02% was in fact lower than the average population growth of 2.3%. The country once 
again imported rice to feed its growing population and continued to do so in the ensuing 
decade. Surprisingly, despite the slowdown in domestic production and the continued 
surge in population, the proportion of imports to total rice production was lower in the 
1980s than in the previous decade (Table 2). This would suggest that average per capita 
demand for rice fell in the 1980s, which could be attributed partly to the significant 
decline in average per capita income during this period owing to a confluence of 
domestic and global factors (David and Balisacan, 1995). 
 
Rice production picked up once more in the 1990s, growing at an average rate of 
about 2.8% a year. This performance was attributable to the rising real domestic rice 
price (despite falling world price) and falling real input prices, except wages (Figures 3 
and 4). The onslaught of the El Niño phenomenon in 1998 caused rice production to fall 
sharply by 24.2%. However, an equally sharp rebound took place in the following year 
when output rose by 37.8%, effectively allowing a positive production growth for the 
decade. Nonetheless, imports during this period surged; the ratio of net imports to total 
production increased to an average of 8.4% (Table 2).   
 
Yield increases accounted for much—about 80%—of the quite remarkable 
production growth in the 1970s. Area expansion constituted the balance. Yield growth 
accounted for an even greater share of output growth in the 1980s. But yield growth 
during this period (2.2%) was lower than in the previous period (5.0%), especially in 
irrigated areas, as increases in rice cropping intensity were not enough to offset the 
declines in rainfed lowland and upland areas planted to rice. In the 1990s, yield growth 
dropped even lower (to 1.0%), accounting for just about one-third of the production 
growth. Although production growth was higher than in the 1980s, the growth came not 
from increases in productivity but from expansion in hectarage planted to rice. 
 
The trend in rice production followed quite closely the trends in technological 
change, irrigation development, price incentives, and the shifts in crop area planted to 
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rice between favorable and less-favorable production environment. In the 1970s, the 
accelerated growth of yield and crop area came from the expansion of irrigated area, 
extensive adoption of modern varieties, and high output and low input prices (Figures 4, 
5, and 6).  
 
In stark contrast, in the 1980s, the adoption of modern varieties started to plateau, 
the crop area expansion slowed down, real prices of rice dropped sharply, input prices 
increased, and credit granted to the palay sector declined (Figures 5 and 7). Rainfed and 
upland crop areas contracted substantially. All these factors could have caused the 
slowdown in rice production growth during this period. 
 
Modest increases in government irrigation spending in the first half of 1990s led 
to the opening up of additional irrigated areas Figure 8. Output prices also continued to 
remain above world prices (though not enough to reverse the overall downward trend 
since the mid-1970s), while input prices other than wages declined up to the onset of the 
Asian financial crisis in late 1997 and 1998. These developments proved favorable for the 
growth of rice production. However, as discussed below, the government’s effort to prop 
up rice prices through quantitative import restrictions hurt landless workers and small 
farmers who are net buyers of rice, as well as urban workers. 
 
Incidentally, public expenditures in agriculture increased markedly in the 1990s 
and early 2000s, but these were not in areas where the gains in terms of improvement in 
long-term productivity are expected to be high (David 2003). Spending on R&D, basic 
transport infrastructure, and institutional development, for example, had low priorities 
vis-à-vis redistribution programs (e.g., NFA procurement, land reform).  
 
 
 
3. Rice Policy Framework  
 
As noted earlier, the government intervened heavily in the rice sector to achieve 
the twin objectives of stable and high prices for farmers and of stable and low prices for 
consumers. It has employed a variety of instruments—output procurement, credit 
subsidies, tariffs and quantitative trade restrictions, provision of rice subsidy to 
consumers, and public spending in research, irrigation, extension, land reform, other 
support services—to effect these objectives.  
 
Of these interventions, perhaps the most controversial ones have to do with the 
operations of the National Food Authority (NFA), the government’s price and supply 
stabilization arm in the rice sector. NFA has the monopoly over international trade of 
rice, the discretion to issue import licenses, and the mandate to operate the marketing and 
price support operations of rice and corn. Its interventions have been justified on the 
grounds that the world rice price is highly volatile and that private traders extract 
monopoly profits from farmers during harvest season and from consumers when rice is 
scarce. Various studies, notably David (2003), Roumasset (1999), Tolentino (1999), and 
Balisacan, Clarete, and Cortez (1992) have shown that these interventions have in fact 
exacerbated market failures, increased the volatility of domestic prices, reduced the 
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welfare of both consumers and producers, discouraged the private sector from investing 
in efficiency-enhancing distribution and storage facilities, and bred corruption and 
institutional sclerosis.  
 
Rather than gaining from NFA operations, taxpayers have in fact been losing. 
Roumasset (1999) estimated the total costs of price controls on rice in 1999 to the tune of 
49 billion pesos: 3.7 billion pesos in terms of foregone tariff revenues, 18.5 billion pesos 
of foregone consumer tax revenue, 7.9 billion pesos of foregone producer tax revenue, 
6.4 billion pesos of excess burden to consumers, and 3.3 billion pesos of excess burden to 
producers. In 1998, the financial subsidies to NFA amounted to over 6.3 billion pesos. 
This amount is far more than the amount (less than one billion pesos) provided to 
agricultural research and development in rice, which arguably yield far higher social rates 
of return. 
 
Notwithstanding the enormous resources spent on NFA operations, domestic rice 
prices are far higher in the Philippines than in other Southeast Asian countries, especially 
since the mid-1990s (Figure 9). In the late 1990s, following the ascension of the country 
to the World Trade Organization (WTO), domestic prices soared, rising 86% and 40% 
higher than in Thailand and Indonesia, respectively. In the same year  (1996), the 
Philippine nominal wholesale price was almost twice (91%) as much as the world price. 
 
 
 
4. Policy and investment responses: two scenarios 
 
Rice production and importation fluctuated in the past forty years. The production 
years between 1977 and 1983, wherein the country was even able to export rice at some 
point, was short lived. During most of the ensuing years, given low growth of 
productivity and rapidly growing population (see Figure 10), consumption increasingly 
outpaced production. Imports rose in tandem with population growth, especially in the 
second half of the 1990s when the country was also beset by the El Nino phenomenon 
(Table 2).  
 
In 1996, in conformity with the country’s accession to the WTO, Congress passed 
Republic Act 8178, which lifted all quantitative import restrictions in agriculture except 
rice. In lieu of these restrictions, their tariff equivalents were put in place. But because it 
is not a simple exercise to find the tariff equivalent of a QR, the process led to “dirty 
tariffication.” Nearly all the commodities were given tariff rates of 100%, even though 
the nominal protection rates of these commodities, based on strict comparison of 
domestic price and world price, were much less than 100% (David 2003). In other words, 
the tariffs given were much more than the tariff equivalents of the protection regime 
existing before the accession to WTO. At the end of the 1990s, the overall tariff 
protection for agriculture (13.3%) was higher than that for industry.  
 
For rice, the tariff equivalent of its present QR from 1995-2002 is 67.2%. This is 
measured as percentage difference between domestic price and comparable world price 
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(Table 3). Clearly this commodity has been highly protected in recent years. As noted 
earlier, protection is justified as a mechanism to shield the incomes of small farmers from 
erosion caused by competitive imports. However, this stance fails to address the root 
causes of the lack of farmers’ capacity to ably compete with imports: the government’s 
failure to provide the required public support services necessary to increase productivity. 
 
The growing list of global and regional trade arrangements necessitates an 
examination on the protection being bestowed to rice producers. The exemption of 
tariffication of rice QRs in the WTO is due to expire in 2004. Any changes in tariffs will 
affect not only the commodity’s output but the other industry’s output as well that uses 
rice as input (i.e. rice milling sector).  
 
In the long run, liberalizing rice trade enhances the welfare of the poor especially 
landless workers and urban consumers. However, there is a short term cost during the 
transition period from the old to the new regime. Farmers may not be able to quickly shift 
productive resources from rice to other activities. Because land is immobile, or because it 
would take time to tailor land for other crops or uses, there would likely be short-term 
adjustment cost for rice farmers (as well as those depending on rice for their productive 
activities). This may take the form of reduced incomes, labor displacement, or both.  
 
To further examine the rice and agriculture problem, an enhanced multi-market 
simulation model of Philippine agriculture, the Agricultural Policy Simulation Model 
(APSM), was used to generate probable outcomes to a variety of “what if” questions. 
Two cases are shown here: a base scenario or the “business-as-usual” agenda and a strong 
reform agenda. In the base case, quantitative restrictions (QRs) equivalent to 50% tariff 
rates are maintained for the major sub-sectors of agriculture (rice included), while public 
investments in the sector continue at a slow pace, as in the 1980s and 1990s. The strong 
reform agenda, on the other hand, is characterized by gradual liberalization of agricultural 
trade – removal of QRs and reduction of tariffs over a five-year period – complemented 
by an increased public investment in support services, particularly irrigation, R&D, and 
extension.1 The results are summarized in Figures 11 and 12. 
 
The “business-as-usual” simulation results suggest that yield growth rates in the 
medium term are low by historical and international standards. Imports of the country’s 
major staples – rice and corn – rise significantly during the period. Poverty reduction is 
slow, especially in rural areas. Furthermore, the low growth of incomes in rural areas 
compared to urban areas induces substantial out-migration form rural to urban areas, 
thereby accentuating population-related urban problems.  
  
On the other hand, the “strong-reform agenda” scenario suggests reduced 
domestic agricultural prices arising from the reduction in tariffs and removal of QRs. 
Farm household incomes rise despite the fall in farm prices owing to increases in 
agricultural productivity that are brought about by a more aggressive public investment in 
irrigation, R&D, and information generation and diffusion. Furthermore, the impact on 
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poverty is high in the medium term:  poverty incidence in this scenario is lower, on the 
average, by 10 percentage points than in the base case.  
 
Clearly, in the Philippine case, the “business-as-usual” approach to governing 
agriculture and the rural sector needs to be abandoned in favor of more aggressive 
reforms and investment aimed at raising agricultural productivity and sustaining gains in 
farm incomes, reducing the “cost of doing business” in rural areas, and taking advantage 
of opportunities for growth offered by globalization. This should also be coupled with 
ensured accountability, improved coordination, and program focus among agriculture-
related agencies of the government. This is an important area where the NGOs, local 
governments and civil society can come in. They must play an active role in planning, 
implementing, and monitoring agricultural and rural development programs. This helps 
foster accountability and sustainability in the system.  
 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
 
The comparatively poor performance of the rice sector in recent years is 
microcosm of the state of Philippine agriculture. Both domestic policies and institutions 
have constrained efficiency and raised the “cost of doing business” in agriculture, thereby 
blunting productivity growth and eroding the country’s competitiveness in the global 
marketplace. Rice has become more expensive in the Philippines than in other developing 
East Asian countries, owing principally to the government’s ill-advised self-sufficiency 
objective. Liberalizing rice trade enhances the welfare of the poor, especially landless 
workers and urban consumers, although the short-term cost to the rice sector in terms of 
reduced incomes and labor displacement may be quite substantial. However, when this is 
combined with public investment in productivity-enhancing support services (particularly 
R&D and irrigation), rice trade liberalization is a win-win proposition. 
 
In addressing the pressing issues of today vis-à-vis poverty and food insecurity, it 
is important not to lose sight of the key lessons on agricultural growth and development 
in Asia in the past half-century.  One such powerful lesson has to do with enabling the 
rural poor through policy, investment, and institutional reforms that enhance the 
efficiency of domestic markets and provide improved access to technology, 
infrastructure, and education.  This enabling environment allows rural growth benefits to 
be broadly based, thereby enhancing overall nutrition, human capital development, and 
productivity and economic growth in the medium- to long-term.  Almost invariably, the 
successful cases of rural development and poverty reduction have shown tenacity in the 
pursuit of efficiency-enhancing reforms.  The key driver to these reforms has been neither 
globalization nor agricultural policy in developed countries.  Rather, it is—by and 
large—the internal realization that reforms are for the benefit of the country and its 
citizens.  
 
Globalization has its downside risks, but it also offers potentially enormous 
benefits. Many developing-country globalizers have shown that those benefits more than 
outweigh the costs:  the speed of poverty reduction is, for example, unprecedented in 
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China, Vietnam, and India.  The challenge for the Philippines is to find the appropriate 
mix of policies and institutions needed to exploit the benefits, while being on guard for 
the downside risks.  Fortuitously, for agriculture and the rural sector, the key policy and 
governance reforms—enhancing economic competition, investing in efficiency-
enhancing infrastructure and support services, and enabling institutions to efficiently 
respond to changes in economic landscape—required for improved efficiency (increased 
productivity and income) are largely compatible with globalization as well.  
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Table 1. Growth rates of palay production, area, and yield by production environment,   
               Philippines 1970-2002. 
                
  1970-1980 1980-1990 1990-2000  1995-2002
             
Total        
 Production 5.92  2.02  2.66  2.79
         
 Area 0.97  -0.18  1.67  0.98
  (16)  (-9)  (63)  (35)
 Yield 4.96  2.21  0.99  1.81
  (84)  (109)  (37)  (65)
Irrigated areas        
 Production 4.75  3.70  3.39  3.40
 Area 1.18  2.45  2.77  2.09
  (25)  (66)  (82)  (62)
 Yield 3.57  1.25  0.62  1.30
  (75)  (34)  (18)  (38)
Rainfed        
 Production 3.08  -0.61  0.78  1.27
 
 Area 1.33  -2.21  0.11  -0.86
  (43)  (362)  (14)  (-68)
 Yield 1.73  1.60  0.68  2.14
  (56)  (-263)  (87)  (168)
Upland        
 Production -1.09  -7.76  -1.62  -1.89
 Area -2.22  -10.67  -3.25  -3.00
  (203)  (138)  (200)  (159)
 Yield 1.14  2.91  1.45  1.04
  (-104)  (-37)  (-89)  (-55)
                
Source: BAS Selected Statistics on Agriculture, various years, updated from David and    
             Balisacan, 1995. 
 
 
 10
Table 2. Trends in imports, ratio of imports to production, and ratio of 
               exports to production of rice, 1960-2001. 
Year Rice Rice Net Rice net imports Availability  
 Production Net imports Availability % of  per capita 
 000 mt 000 mt 000 mt production (kg/cap) 
  (a) (b) (a) + (b) (b) / (a)   
1965 2,613 339 2,952 12.97 93 
1966 2,653 108 2,761 4.07 86 
1967 2,811 310 3,121 11.03 98 
1968 2,893 -15 2,878 -0.52 83 
1969 3,179 -1 3,178 -0.03 87 
1970 3,459 -2 3,457 -0.06 91 
1971 3,416 379 3,795 11.08 101 
1972 3,324 451 3,775 13.57 98 
1973 3,501 308 3,809 8.81 96 
1974 3,607 165 3,772 4.58 91 
1975 4,148 147 4,295 3.54 100 
1976 4,253 55 4,308 1.29 99 
1977 4,715 -15 4,700 -0.32 112 
1978 4,688 -47 4,641 -1.01 111 
1979 4,995 -127 4,868 -2.55 110 
1980 4,970 -231 4,740 -4.64 95 
1981 5,142 -83 5,059 -1.62 101 
1982 5,417 0 5,417 0.00 109 
1983 4,742 -40 4,702 -0.84 81 
1984 5,089 190 5,279 3.74 97 
1985 5,724 541 6,265 9.45 122 
1986 6,010 0 6,010 0.00 110 
1987 5,551 0 5,551 0.00 92 
1988 5,831 95 5,926 1.63 101 
1989 6,148 209 6,357 3.40 103 
1990 6,058 593 6,651 9.79 113 
1991 6,288 -10 6,278 -0.16 102 
1992 5,934 -30 5,904 -0.51 88 
1993 6,132 210 6,342 3.42 93 
1994 6,850 0 6,850 0.00 99 
1995 6,851 240 7,091 3.50 103 
1996 7,334 893 8,227 12.17 118 
1997 7,325 731 8,056 9.98 113 
1998 5,561 2,126 7,686 38.23 102 
1999 7,661 782 8,443 10.20 114 
2000 8,053 617 8,670 7.66 115 
2001 8,421 739 9,160 8.78 119 
            
Source: BAS, NSO, and NFA, updated from David and  Balisacan, 1995.  
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Table 3.  Trends in domestic price, border price, and nominal protection 
                 rate of rice, Philippines. 1960-2000.
          
  Domestic Border price ($/t)            
 Pricea World World World      
 $/t priceb pricec priced(+15%) NPR     
  (1) (2) (3) (4)       
1975 250 269 363 309 -31.24     
1976 257 213 255 245 1.08      
1977 265 228 272 262 -2.74     
1978 259 321 368 369 -29.41     
1979 264 292 334 336 -21.10     
1980 284 387 434 445 -34.63     
1981 315 402 483 462 -34.66     
1982 306 243 293 279 4.42      
1983 257 239 277 275 -7.36     
1984 268 233 252 268 6.17      
1985 325 198 216 228 50.58      
1986 265 180 211 207 25.81      
1987 266 204 230 235 15.83      
1988 288 272 301 313 -4.25     
1989 345 291 320 335 7.81      
1990 345 248 287 285 20.11      
1991 310 241 314 277 -1.24     
1992 349 233 287 268 21.39      
1993 369 203 270 234 36.67      
1994 427 347 268 399 59.57      
1995 545 290 321 334 69.78      
1996 605 276 339 317 78.52      
1997 516 247 304 284 70.02      
1998 386 250 304 287 26.89      
1999 403  211 248 242 62.37      
2000 367 167 202 192 81.68      
2001 314 149 173 171 81.44      
2002 320 171 192 196 66.94      
Notes :          
a  - Refers to domestic wholesale price.  Source: Bureau of Agricultural Statistics   
b  - Refers to 35% brokens,   Source:  World Bank/ADB.      
c - Refers to 5% broken, fob Bangkok        
d  - Refers to 35% brokens, fob Bangkok + 15% to convert to CIF Manila,  Source:  World Bank/ADB. 
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Figure 1.   Percent share of major crops, livestock and poultry to agriculture     
                  GVA, 1967-2002, Philippines. 
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Notes: 
Domestic  - Refers to domestic wholesale price.  Source: Bureau of Agricultural Statistics 
World price  - Refers to 35% brokens, fob Bangkok + 15% to convert to CIF Manila   Source:  World Bank/ADB. 
CPI all items is used to deflate domestic prices. Source: National Statistics Office 
US PPI all items is used to deflate world prices. Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics 
Figures updated from David and Balisacan, 1995. 
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Sources:      Wholesale ordinary price of rice, corn grain prices, urea, agricultural wages from BAS. 
 Price of sugar from SRA. 
 Retail prices for machinery, agricultural chemicals, and wholesale price index from NSO and SPEI-BSP. 
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Figures updated from David and Balisacan, 1995. 
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Figure 6.  Trends in the adoption of modern varieties and rate of irrigated area,   
                  Philippines, 1966-2002, (3-year moving average).  
                     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: BAS, updated from David and Balisacan, 1995. 
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Figure 7.  Trends in the agricultural production loans granted to palay sector, 
                  1980-2002, Philippines, (3-year moving average). 
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Figure 9. Trends in domestic wholesale prices of rice in selected Asian countries, 
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Yield of Major Crops, Philippines
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Net imports of staple will rise sharply.... 
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Prices of Major Crops, Philippines
 Difference Between Base and Simulated Scenario
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Figure  12.  Alternative scenario: “strong reform” agenda. 
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Figure  12 (cont’d.).  Alternative Scenario:“Strong Reform”Agenda. 
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